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Citizenship, Law, and the American Nation
KENNETH L. KARST*
Maybe it is true that the center will not hold. Yet, despite the title of her
article in this issue of the Journal, Linda Bosniak does not predict an
imminent devaluation of U.S. citizenship.' Rather, she offers a critical survey
ofa growing body of literature suggesting that national citizenship and national
loyalties are in a state of decline, or arguing that what the world needs now is
a pluralization of citizenship, with the nation only one among many attachments
and with the very word "citizen" denationalized. To the extent that this
literature represents factual claims or predictions, my own response is
agnostic. Perhaps the process of dilution is already under way; voting
percentages have been declining in the United States, and a distinct literature
bemoans the erosion of our (non-govemmental) civil society? Those who feel
threatened by "Balkanization," 3 or who see the United States not as a nation-
state but "a nation of nationalities, '4 may have their perceptions validated.5 In
the century to come, the nation may, indeed, face a crisis in national identity.6
It would not be the first time.
This Comment is not an exercise in counter-prediction. I leave it to
observers in the twenty-first century to characterize what will have happened.
Instead, this is a Comment on the normative branch of the literature of
denationalized citizenship. Writers emphasizing the denationalized nature of
citizenship express two overlapping preferences. First, they fancy a pluralized
meaning for the term "citizenship," in which allegiance to the nation is but one
among a variety of meanings. Second, they aspire to create and maintain
multiple and diverse forms of "postnational" citizenship-global or local, public
or private, or all at once. These writings, Professor Bosniak reminds us, are
above all rhetorical; they are long on the morality of universal regard for
* David G. Price and Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Linda S. Bosniak, CitizenshipDenationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life,
AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 35.
3. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1991).
4. Michael Walzer, Comment, in MULTICULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION:" AN ESSAY BY CHARLES TAYLOR 101 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1992).
5. I have expressed my doubts elsewhere. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Bonds of American
Nationhood, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1141 (2000).
6. See Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REv. 597, 598 (1999).
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persons, and short on identifying means for translating that universalist ethic
into a political or social reality. Many of the writings appear in philosophical
journals, where editors might think themselves churlish if they asked for
blueprints. However, surely a law journal is an appropriate venue for a lawyer
to draw attention to such institutional questions.
Possibly-just possibly-the idea of denationalized citizenship may have
appeal for citizens of some countries where national citizenship is a formal
status and little more. Here, though, I address U.S. readers. The remarks that
follow highlight the centrality of law in defining the meanings of citizenship in
today's America, and in protecting citizenship's substantive values of respect,
responsibility, and participation. For readers in a hurry, I disclose my
conclusion now: For Americans, it would be the gravest folly to act with the
purpose of undermining the significance of national citizenship until they have
a reasonable assurance that alternative mechanisms, global or local, will
provide equivalent protections of individual liberty, equality, and democracy.
The idea of citizenship carries many potential meanings, which Professor
Bosniak ably sorts into categories: citizenship as status, citizenship as rights,
and citizenship as identity or solidarity.' This division is a useful analytical
strategy given the global reach of her discussion. But in late twentieth century
U.S. experience, these "strands" of citizenship, as she calls them, gained
strength as they became tightly entwined. National law played a crucial role
in that transformation. Consider the formal status of citizenship, which seemed
to Alexander Bickel a trifling matter-"at best a simple idea for a simple
government."' But to an African-American living under Jim Crow, or to many
a resident alien today, the status was and is a prize to strive for.9 Some
readers of these words will be old enough to remember the newspaper
photographs of African-American citizens, newly enfranchised by the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as they stood in line to vote, many of the men in coats and
ties. The formal status of citizenship can seem trifling only when you are able
to take it for granted. Voting, of course, is not primarily the power to affect
the choices of public officeholders and public policies; it is the preeminent
7. She does so in Part I, pages 455-88, of this issue, constituting more than half of the article.'
8. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 54 (1975).
9. In 1977, 1 remarked summarily that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause
was entirely capable of extending much of the larger principle of equal citizenship to aliens.
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1977). Professor
Bosniak gave the subject the thorough treatment it deserved in an insightful article published six
years ago. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes,
69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047 (1994).
10. Indeed, a single citizen's vote almost never will decide an election. See ANTHONY DOWNS,
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expression of citizenship, of identity as an equal member of the national
community.
More broadly, it was national law that braided the strands of
citizenship-formal legal status, equal rights, and belonging-into the principle of
equal citizenship. I refer not only to the Supreme Court's line of egalitarian
constitutional decisions commencing with Shelley v. Kraemer" and Brown
v. Board of Education,2 but also to a series of acts of Congress beginning
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. My insistence on the singularity of equal
citizenship in this country is not a quibble about taxonomy; separating the
abstract idea of citizenship into various strands is a sensible heuristic practice
for a global survey. What I seek to emphasize here is a substantive feature of
American citizenship in our time: it blends equality of status with a sense of
belonging, with the entire process founded upon law. Today, the equal
citizenship principle, embodied in the U.S. Constitution and further effectuated
by legislation, is indispensable to the protection of Americans' rights to equality,
liberty, and democracy. In turn, this state of the law is to some degree self-
perpetuating, for it is now widely seen as an organic part of the meaning of
American citizenship-indeed, it is embedded in the meaning of the nation
itself."
Let no U.S. citizen feel complacent about these developments. The
principle of equal citizenship was largely honored in the breach for the first
century-and-a-halfofour national history,14 and even today, after the advances
ofthe last five decades, the principle remains unfulfilled. For those who would
remedy this deficiency, two major tasks lie ahead. First, groups defined by
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and other "primordial" identities
still face a variety of forms of exclusion from full participation in public life.
The inclination to maintain these exclusions is especially virulent in some local
communities, and especially likely to be carried out there. Second, because full
participation as a citizen rests on a material base, 5 poverty excludes large
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 151-54 (1957).
11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. On the centrality of the American civic culture-a cluster of values emphasizing
individualism, equality, nationalism, and tolerance of diversity-in defining the nation and what it
means to be an American, see Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and
Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 361-77 (1986).
14. The modem definitive work on this theme is ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1997).
15. This assertion, of course, is an echo of THOMAS H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL
CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1950). For an up to date analysis, see Joel F. Handler, The Moral
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numbers ofU.S. citizens from full membership in the national community, and
the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots" is widening. Historically, the
most effective responses to both types of exclusion have taken the form of
national law.
Much of the history of the modem recognition of equal citizenship in the
United States can be told as a story about the uses of national law in taming
local oppression, with Jim Crow as the most egregious twentieth century
example. The communities that excluded African-Americans from
participation were local communities, but the legal claims to inclusion were
founded on a national ideal of citizenship. The eradication of the worst
features of Jim Crow was a cooperative effort of Congress and the federal
judiciary in making and enforcing national law. In the wake of these
developments, most states and many cities have adopted legislation forbidding
discrimination on racial and other grounds. Yet, some forms of local legislation
and private behavior continue to promote the exclusion of groups from equal
citizenship. In at least some such cases, the Supreme Court has decisively
held the local laws invalid. A prominent recent decision is Romer v. Evans,16
which struck down an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that
purported to bar state agencies and local governments from protecting lesbians
and gay men against private discrimination.
The effective exclusion of poor U.S. citizens from full citizenship is not the
direct result of either local or national governmental action, nor is it the result
of concerted private action aimed at heaping disadvantages on the poor. The
gulf between the comfortable and the poor is, in many respects, the product of
myriad decisions in domestic and foreign market transactions. If a "safety
net" is to be provided for poor Americans, the only practical source will be a
legislative program at the national level. State and local governments are, of
course, empowered to adopt social welfare legislation, but the prospects for
redistribution at these levels are dim. Legislators regularly express the fear
that local welfare generosity will have a "magnet" effect, inducing poor people
from other localities to move for the purpose of collecting higher welfare
benefits. 7 In any case, welfare is out of vogue in U.S. politics. If any
governmental effort is made to bring the poor into full membership, it will likely
Construction of Social Citizenship and the Crisis of the Welfare State (1999) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
16. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
17. Contrary to this widely-held belief, this "welfare magnet" effect has not been demonstrated
empirically; the statement in the text refers to beliefs expressed by legislators.
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be a program to provide the opportunity for employment at a decent wage, and
with the security of health and pension benefits to all who seek it. By any
reckoning, such a program will require national legislation, even if state
governments participate in it. The historical precedent for such a program
would be the New Deal, and the most persuasive argument for it would take
the shape of an appeal based on our common citizenship: These are citizens
of the United States, and it is intolerable to let them live this way.
The globalization of the labor market presents a huge obstacle to the
success of a U.S. full-employment program. Further, even if means could be
found to minimize that obstacle," for the immediate future it seems fanciful to
imagine that Congress will enact any such program, let alone a program
sufficiently far-reaching to bring large numbers of the poor into the community
of equal citizens. The poor, after all, are politically inert. Yet, if anything
serious is to be done about the practical exclusion ofthe poor from citizenship,
it will be done by the national government. Similarly, if anything serious is to
be done about local exclusions of locally disfavored groups from citizenship, it
will be done through national law. If either of these forms of national effort
are to come to pass, they will be undertaken in the name ofthe responsibilities
of American citizens to each other.
The principle of equal citizenship, largely defined and effectuated by law,
has recently done a lot of heavy lifting in the cause of liberty, equality, and
democracy in the United States. Without it, we should be very much the
poorer, both in substance and in spirit. All this is to say that anyone who
proposes to downplay U.S. national citizenship and its legal underpinnings
ought to be prepared to do more than merely instruct U.S. citizens in the ethic
of universal regard. If the proponents of postnational citizenship are to
persuade U.S. citizens to go along with their project, they will have to offer an
institutional framework that serves to protect the substantive values of
citizenship. It is not enough to point out the dangers of rabid nationalism
(which I, for one, concede), or the danger that tying rights to the formal status
ofcitizenship may leave aliens in the United States improperly excluded (I said
before that aliens are constitutionally entitled to most of the guarantees of
equal citizenship, 9 and the Supreme Court has accepted this idea to a modest
degree)." In short, what the proponents of postnational citizenship need to
18. For some reflections on this possibility, and citations to scholars who are truly competent
to think about it, see Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective,
82 CORN. L. REV. 523, 559-62 (1997).
19. See supra note 9.
20. See. e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984). The
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offer, if they hope to convince significant numbers of U.S. citizens beyond the
readers of academic journals, is law.
The international law of human rights may, in a future not yet visible,
become an acceptable alternative tojudicial enforcement ofthe Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Something along these lines has happened
in the United Kingdom, where accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Treaty of Rome has produced important substantive
changes in domestic law, enforced by British courts.2 However, as Professor
Bosniak notes, Europe is a special case. In most of the world, if human rights
are not enforced by national law, they are not enforced at all. This is not to
deny that the international law of human rights has long-term persuasive
power, but it is to say that typically a "citizen of the world" (in contrast to a
citizen of a Member State in the European Community) has only the most
tenuous guarantee that his or her human rights will find legal protection outside
some country's national law.
When we turn to the material foundations for real citizenship, the prospects
seem remote for a citizenship that truly extends over the globe. For example,
a colleague recently told me that about one-half the world's population has
never used a telephone. Even if that factoid should be an exaggeration, it hints
at the magnitude of difficulty attending any effort to assure a material base for
global citizenship. Existing international organizations are doing heroic work
in areas such as famine relief and disaster relief, with resources that are
already overextended; when the issue is jobs and incomes, these organizations
will be slender reeds on which the world's poor can lean. If the World Trade
Organization should ever show a genuine interest in the problems ofthe poor,
then I shall believe in fairies and clap my hands.
If, as Professor Bosniak remarks, the notion ofdenationalized citizenship
remains largely rhetorical and aspirational, it is fair to ask the proponents: To
what do you aspire? My claim here is that, in the United States today,
citizenship is inextricable from a complex legal framework that includes a
widely accepted body of substantive law, strong law-making institutions, and
law-enforcing institutions capable of performing their tasks. Who will make
law when citizenship is denationalized and scattered among public and private
agencies around the globe? What subjects will this law address? Who will
Court has not carried this development nearly so far as I (or Professor Bosniak) might wish.
21. I predicted this result in Judicial Review and the Channel Tunnel which was written before
there was a Channel Tunnel. Kenneth L. Karst, Judicial Review and the Channel Tunnel, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 447 (1980).
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appoint the lawmakers? Who will be charged with enforcing the law, and will
they have effective power to do so? If a postnational citizen is unhappy when
Serbs kill Kosovars, or Kosovars kill Serbs, to which global official should she
send a letter? Will there be an election-or twenty elections-in which she has
a vote? Why on earth should she bother? Most vitally of all, when the global
institution itself acts against a postnational citizen, who will protect the citizen's
rights to liberty, equality, and democracy? Why should any American see an
assortment of dispersed and relatively weak postnational citizenships as
preferable to a relatively strong national citizenship founded on law?

